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Abstract—In this paper we propose a novel method for
detecting adversarial examples by training a binary classifier
with both origin data and saliency data. In the case of image
classification model, saliency simply explain how the model
make decisions by identifying significant pixels for prediction.
A model shows wrong classification output always learns wrong
features and shows wrong saliency as well. Our approach shows
good performance on detecting adversarial perturbations. We
quantitatively evaluate generalization ability of the detector,
showing that detectors trained with strong adversaries perform
well on weak adversaries.
Index Terms—Adversarial Examples, Saliency, Convolutional
Neural Networks, Model Interpretation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have made
significant progress in classification problems [1]–[4], which
have shown to generate good results when provided suffi-
cient data. However, CNNs are found to be easily fooled
by adversarial examples generated by adding small and visu-
ally imperceptible modifications on normal samples, leading
to wrong classification results. The existence of adversarial
examples reminds us rethinking differences between human
visual system and computer vision system based on DNNs.
Many defense methods [5]–[12] are proposed to make neural
networks more robust to adversarial examples.
Recently, improving CNNs robustness to adversarial exam-
ples has attracted the attention of many researchers. Several
defense methods are proposed to classify adversarial examples
correctly, while most of these methods are easily to be attacked
as well. Detection on adversarial examples is another de-
fense task focusing on distinguish between clean samples and
adversarial samples [13]–[19]. By assuming that adversarial
dataset and origin dataset are intrinsically different, classifiers
are trained to determine if a sample is clean or adversarial.
However, these detection are can be easily destroyed by con-
structing a differentiable function that is minimized for fooling
both classifier and detector with strong iterative attacks.
In this work, we adopt saliency, a tool for explaining how
a classification DNN can be queried about the spatial support
of a particular class in a given image, to tackle with detecting
adversarial examples. To calculate saliency for an output w.r.t.
input image, we use calculations with gradients to figure out
importance of each individual pixels which is meant to reflect
their influence on the final classification. Notice that a model
learns wrong classification output always learns wrong features
and wrong saliency as well. Using the DNN’s intrinsic quality
that adversarial samples don’t completely match it’s saliency
guides us training a binary classifier to distinguish between
real and fake samples.
II. BACKGROUND
Formally, given an image x with ground truth y = fθ(x),
non-targeted adversarial example x∗ targeted adversarial ex-
ample x∗t for target t are suppose to satisfy the following
constraints:
fθ(x
∗) 6= y (1)
fθ(x
∗
t ) = t (2)
d(x, x∗) ≤ B (3)
where function d denote distance metric to quantify similarity
and B denote upper bound of allowed perturbation  to origin
image.
In the case of DNNs, the classification model fθ is a highly
non-linear function. To seek out which pixels leading to wrong
classification when given adversarial sample, fθ is usually
approximated as a linear function:
fθ(x) = θwx+ θb (4)
The image-specific class saliency can be calculated as the
derivative of fθ w.r.t. input at the image x.
θw =
∂fθ(x)
∂x
(5)
The computation of the image-specific saliency map for a
single class is extremely quick, since it only requires a single
back-propagation pass.
A. Crafting Adversarial Examples
Fast Gradient Sign Methods (FGSM) and Iterated Fast
Gradient Sign Methods. [20] proposed a simple gradient
based algorithm to generate adversarial examples. With a
hyper-parameter step-width ε, adversarial example can be
generated by performing one step in the direction of the
gradients sign:
x∗ = x+ ε · sign(∂fθ(x)
∂x
) (6)
FGSM is a weak attack which is not designed for gener-
ating the minimal adversarial perturbations. [10] introduced
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an iterative version of the fast gradient sign methods, where
replace step-width ε with multiple smaller steps α and setting
clip value ε for accumulated perturbations in all iterations.
Iterated FGSM start by setting x∗0 = x, and for each iteration
i computing x∗0 with:
x∗i = clipε(x
∗
i−1 + α · sign(
∂fθ(x)
∂x
)) (7)
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA). [21]
proposed a greedy algorithm using the Jacobian to determine
choosing which pixel to be perturbed.
st =
∂t
∂xi
;
so =
∑
j 6=t
∂j
∂xi
;
s(xi) = st |so| · (st < 0) · (so > 0)
(8)
In Equation 8, st represents the Jacobian of target class t
w.r.t. input image and so represents sum of Jacobian values
of all non-target class. Changing the selected pixel will sig-
nificantly increase the likelihood of the model labeling the
image as the target class. Clearly, JSMA attack works towards
optimizing the L0 distance metric.
C&W’s Attack. [22] proposed an attack by approximating
the solution to the following optimization problem:
argmin(d(s, x+ δ) + c · l(x+ δ)) (9)
where l is objective function for solving f(x + δ) = t. In
this work, we choose l(x∗ = max(max(Z(x∗)i : i 6= t) −
Z(x∗)t,−κ), where κ is the hyper-parameter controlling the
confidence of misclassification.
B. Detecting Adversarial Examples
A “N + 1” classification model D is trained [16] to detect
adversarial examples with the method of adding adversaries
to the training set, assigning a new N + 1st label for them.
However, experiments in [23] shows that this detection failed
distinguishing adversarial examples at nearly 0% accuracy
under a second round attack. Experiment in in [23] also shows
that this detection methods cannot resist black-box attack
where attackers have no access to D. By splitting training set
in half for individually training two models, D and imitated D,
C&W’s Attack succeed 98% when fooling D using parameters
for attacking imitated D.
Similar to approach in [16], [15] constructs a “1 + 1”
classification model by means of regarding real data and fake
data as two completely different datasets despite being visually
similar. Because of the intrinsic similarity between“N + 1”
detection model and “1 + 1” detection model, this method
also failed at second round attack in nearly 0% accuracy for
detecting adversarial examples. Black-box attack on “1 + 1”
doesn’t show significant difference with “N + 1” .
Extending approaches in [16] and [15] to features inside net-
works, [24] augment the base network by adding subnetworks
as branches at some layers and produce an output padv ∈ [0, 1]
representing the probability of the input being adversarial. By
training the subnetworks with a balanced binary classification
dataset consist of clean data and fake data generated by
attacking freezed base network, the subnetwork can detect
adversarial examples at the inner convolutional layers of
the network. Similar to above two second round attacking
methods, [24] propose an iterative calculating methods:
xadv0 = x
xadvn+1 = clip

x{xadvn + α[(1− σ) · sign(∇xJf (xadvn
, ytrue(x))) + σ · sign(∇xJd(xadvn , 1))]}
(10)
Parameter σ is used for trading off objective for base classifier
f and objective for detection classifier.
C. Gradients as Saliencys
A common approach to understanding the decisions of
image classification systems is to find regions of an image
that were particularly influential to the final classification
[25]–[30]. At visual level, saliency represents discriminative
pixels for model making decisions and [31] launches weakly
supervised object segmentation experiment by only relying
on saliency map. Saliency of wrong decision caused by fake
sample always visually different from Saliency derived from
right sample.
Detection method in [24] works well because feature maps
of fake samples differ from features maps of clean samples
in data distribution. We simplify this detection method by
only training detector with first layer feature maps for clean
data and fake data. This detector achieve 99.1% False positive
rate and 99.0% True positive rates on detecting adversarial
examples in spite of the simplification strategy. However,
these two detection method cannot withstand a second-round
attack which fool both original classification model and binary
classifier detector. We apply attacking method in Equation
10 generating adversarial examples and lead to nearly 100%
successful attacking rate. By training detector with both feature
maps in first layer and corresponding Jacobian w.r.t input
image, existing second-round attack method cannot generate
effective adversary directly.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we provide technique steps for building
detectors trained with both information in pixel space and
information in saliency. As is shown in Figure. 1, when an
image is perturbed with given attacking method, saliency
of classification output w.r.t. adjusted image is perturbed as
well. Intuitively, attackers are supposed to keep matching for
perturbed image and corresponding saliency when attacking
this detector.Accordingly, We follow the steps below building
our detection system.
Step1. Train a classifier F with origin training dataset
Xtrain, then craft adversarial dataset Xadvtrain and X
adv
test by
attacking F using FGSM/Iterated FGSM/JSMA/C&W.
Step2. By calculating saliency for each image in Xtrain,
Xtest, Xadvtrain and X
adv
test based on the attacked classifier F ,
we create saliency dataset Strain, Stest, Sadvtrain and S
adv
test.
MNIST
CIFAR10
IMAGENET
sea snake puck, hockey puck cradlehamster
7 2 9 3 4 2
ship airplane truck deer truck cat
Fig. 1. Origin image from MNIST,CIFAR10,Imagenet dataset and their
corresponding saliency. For each four-grids sample, left parts display clean
data and right parts display fake data attacked by FGSM. Lower half in four-
grids sample represent corresponding saliency of upper half images.
Step3. We apply both raw data and saliency data as input
for training binary classifier D. Raw data and saliency data
are concatenated on channel axis in our experiment.
We evaluate false positive and true positive rates of detector.
Furthermore, we evaluate two kinds of generalizability of D:
1) Attacked by the same adversary with different  and 2)
Attacked by one adversary when tested on data from other
adversaries when fixing .
Intuitively, assuming that parameters of classifier F and
detector D are provided, one can attack F and D at the same
time, called Second-round Attack, which have been expressed
in Equation 10. However, traditional Second-round attack
methods, eg. Equation 10 are not applicable for attacking our
detection model.
IV. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we present result of accuracy on detecting
adversarial samples generated with FGSM, Iterative l1, Iter-
ative l∞ and C&w attack with 3 dataset: MNIST, CIFAR10,
Imagenet subset [32]. We evaluate generalizability of D for the
same attack on F with different choices of . We also evaluate
generalizability of D for the same perturbation extent  with
different attacking methods on F .
A. Implementation Details
Our experiment is implemented with Keras 2.0 and Ten-
sorflow 1.0 [33]. All attacks are built with an adversarial
example library cleverhans [34]. Deep neural networks we
adopt for Classifier F network and Detector D network are
showed in Table I. For MNIST/CIFAR10 dataset, Detector(D)
network is smaller than Classifier network since intuitively
binary classification for adversary detection task extract less
features. Besides, all CNNs for MNIST/CIFAR10 datasets are
trained from scratch. We follow [24] dataset collecting method,
randomly selecting 10 classes from Imagenet training set and
validation set, The random selected classes are: mongoose;
plant, flora, plant life; Yawl; timber wolf, grey wolf, gray wolf,
Canis lupus; dugong, Dugong dugon; hammer; sunglasses,
dark glasses, shades; typewriter keyboard; triumphal arch;
mushroom. Therefore, We have 10000 images in train set,
3035 images in validation set and 500 images(from Imagenet
validation data) in test set. The motivation of using subset
instead of full-dataset is of two-fold: 1) to reduce computation
cost of crafting adversarial dataset, 2) to avoid adversarial
conversion between similar classes, eg. perturbing image rec-
ognized as sea snake to image recognized as water snake is
not constructive. We employ VGG16 and its parameters from
Caffe model zoo on initializing F and D for 10-CLASSES
Imagenet.
We employ 5 typical attacking algorithms in this paper:
FGSM, Iterative FGSM with l2 distance, Iterative FGSM with
l∞ distance, JSMA, and C&W attack. We revise origin FGSM
to avoid label leaking problem [10]. JSMA is not applied to
Imagenet subset for its’ low efficiency on pixel searching when
attacking images of size 224*224*3.
B. MNIST/CIFAR10
We train MNIST-NET-F shown in Table I for 10 epochs
with Adam optimizer [35] and learning rate was set to 0.001.
MNIST-NET-F run up to 99.73% and 99.32% accuracy on
training data and test data respectively. Afterwards, adversarial
dataset was generated with 4 attacks. With clean data and
adversarial data, we calculate saliency maps for all images.
MNIST-NET-D are trained for 10 epochs with Adam optimizer
where learning rate was set to 0.0001. CIFAR10-NET-F are
trained for 100 epochs with Adam optimizer where learning
rate was set to 0.0001, CIFAR10-NET-f run up to 83.89%
and 81.32% accuracy on training data and test data respec-
tively. CIFAR10-NET-D are trained for 5 epochs with Adam
optimizer where setting learning rate as 0.0001. False positive
and True positive rates of MNIST-NET-D and CIFAR10-NET-
D are shown in table II.
Results in Table III show similar performance of gener-
alizability where a D trained with large  cannot reach a
good effect on adversarial samples generated with small .
Meanwhile, D trained with adversarial samples crafted with
small  generalized acceptably well to all adversarial samples.
Following [24], We set  as minimal under the constraint
that the classification accuracy is below 30%. Result in Figure.
2 shows that FGSM and JSMA generalized not good enough
with detector trained with iterative(l2) and detector trained
iterative(l∞) , but iterative(l2) based detector and iterative(l∞)
based detector perform well to FGSM-based adversaries and
JSMA-based adversaries. CIFAR10 dataset show similar char-
acter with MNIST experiment except that JSMA and FGSM
TABLE I
DEEP NEURAL NETWORK USED IN OUR IMPLEMENTATION FOR DIFFERENT DATASETS, CALLED MNIST-NET-F, MNIST-NET-D, CIFAR10-NET-F,
CIFAR10-NET-D, VGG16-F AND VGG16-D IN FOLLOWING PASSAGE. MNIST-NET-F, MNIST-NET-D, CIFAR10-NET-F, CIFAR10-NET-D ARE
TRAINED FROM SCRATCH, AND THE LEFT TWO ARE FINETUNED WITH VGG PARAMETERS FROM CAFFE MODEL ZOO. ALL POOLING OPERATIONS AND
ACTIVATIONS ARE SET TO MAXPOOLING AND RELU RESPECTIVELY, WHICH ARE NOT SHOWN IN THIS TABLE FOR BREVITY.
Dataset. MNIST CIFAR10 10-CLASS Imagenet
Classifier(F)
Input(28,28,1),Conv(3,3,1,32),
Conv(3,3,32,32),Conv(3,3,32,64),
Conv(3,3,64,64),Fc(12544,100),Fc(100,10)
Input(32,32,3),Conv(3,3,3,32),
Conv(3,3,32,32),Conv(3,3,32,64),
Conv(3,3,64,64),Fc(16384,100),Fc(200,10)
Input(224,224,3),VGG-block1,
VGG-block2,VGG-block3,
Fc(25088,4096),Fc(4096,4096),Fc(4096,10)
Detector(D)
Input(28,28,2),Conv(3,3,2,32),
Conv(3,3,32,32),Conv(3,3,32,64),
Conv(3,3,64,64),Fc(12544,100),Fc(100,1)
Input(32,32,3),Conv(3,3,3,32),
Conv(3,3,32,32),Conv(3,3,32,64),
Conv(3,3,64,64),Fc(16384,100),Fc(200,1)
Input(224,224,6),VGG-block1,
VGG-block2,VGG-block3,
Fc(25088,4096),Fc(4096,4096),Fc(4096,2)
TABLE II
ACCURACY ON ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES GENERATED WITH FGSM, ITERATIVE l1 , ITERATIVE l∞ AND C&W ATTACK.
Dataset FGSM/ Iterative l∞/ Iterative l2/ C&W attack
f(xtest) f(x
adv(f)
test ) D(xtest) D(f(x
adv(f)
test ))
MNIST 0.99/ 0.99/ 0.99/ 0.99 0.12/ 0.05/ 0.04/ 0.03 1.00/ 1.00/ 0.99/ 0.99 0.99/ 1.00/ 1.00/ 1.00
CIFAR10 0.81/ 0.81/ 0.81/ 0.81 0.13/ 0.07/ 0.07/ 0.06 0.98/ 0.98/ 0.91 / 0.94 0.98/ 0.98/ 0.91/ 0.95
10-Imagenet 0.90/ 0.90/ 0.90/ 0.81 0.17/ 0.09/ 0.12 /0.10 0.92/ 0.91/ 0.93/ 0.89 0.90/ 0.91/ 0.94/0.84
TABLE III
ACCURACY METRICS ON MNIST/CIFAR10 OF DETECTOR TRAINED FOR ADVERSARY WITH MAXIMAL DISTORTION fit WHEN TESTED ON THE SAME
ADVERSARY WITH DISTORTION test .
FGSM/MNIST Iter(l∞)/MNIST Iter(l2)/MNIST FGSM/CIFAR10 Iter(l∞)/CIFAR10 Iter(l2)/CIFAR10
test
fit 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0.95 0.88 0.71 0.65 0.91 0.87 0.81 0.65 0.86 0.80 0.76 0.70 0.89 0.75 0.61 0.58 0.89 0.82 0.77 0.65 0.81 0.78 0.74 0.65
2 0.95 1.00 0.90 0.89 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.88 0.91 0.95 0.86 0.81 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.90 0.82 0.89 0.82 0.78
3 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.87 0.94 0.97 0.92
4 0.92 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.90 0.95 0.97 1.00 0.91 0.92 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.91 0.94 0.98 0.99
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Fig. 2. Accuracy metrics on MNIST/CIFAR10/Imagenet-subset of detector trained for one adversary when tested on other adversaries. The maximal distortion
of the adversary (when applicable) has been chosen minimally such that the predictive accuracy of the classifier is below 30%. Numbers correspond to the
detection accuracy for unseen test data.
cannot generalized well to each other. Therefore, we draw the
conclusion for our detection approach that stronger adversary
generalize well to the weak adversary since iterated method is
stronger than fast method to some extent and JSMA optimize
loss function under l0 distance metrics where concentrated on
perturbing small group of pixels severely, leading to incom-
patible results with other three adversary.
C. Imagenet subset
In this section, we concentrated on studying one question:
if our detection approach could perform well on eye-level im-
ages. Empirically, adversarial examples on MNIST/CIFAR10
usually show visually distinguishable perturbation even texture
and structure of origin image are changed. Therefore, many re-
searches on defending MNIST/CIFAR10-level adversary helps
little to find out the extrinsic difference between human visual
system and deep neural networks. Take MNIST adversary for
example, saliency of wrong output w.r.t. adversarial example
seems visually approximate to its’ perturbation. However, in
Imagenet-level images, these unreasonable properties found on
MNIST/CIFAR10-level no longer appear.
In this experiment, we use 3 attacking methods: FGSM,
Iterative(l1) and Iterative(l∞) for their suitable demand for
computation recourses. We fine-tuning VGG16-F shown in
TABLE IV
ACCURACY METRICS ON IMAGENET SUBSET OF DETECTOR TRAINED FOR
ADVERSARY WITH MAXIMAL DISTORTION WHEN TESTED ON THE SAME
ADVERSARY WITH DISTORTION TEST. EVALUATION METHOD IS THE SAME
AS MNIST/CIFAR10 EVALUATION SETTINGS.
FGSM Iter(l∞) Iter(l2)
test
fit 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 0.84 0.74 0.60 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.75 0.79 0.79
2 0.89 0.92 0.82 0.80 0.90 0.92 0.69 0.88 0.88
3 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.69 0.92 0.92
Table I for 10000 epochs with Adam optimizer [35]. Initial
learning rate was set to 0.001, reduced to 0.0001 after 100
epochs, and further reduced to 0.00001 after 1000 epochs.
VGG16-F runs up to 91.82% and 89.83% accuracy on training
data and test data respectively. VGG16-D are trained for 100
epochs with Adam optimizer where learning rate was set to
0.0001.False positive and True positive rates of VGG16-D are
shown in Table II.
Result in Table IV shows similar direction with
MNIST/CIFAR10 experiment: detectors trained with smaller
perturbation upper-bound generally perform well on higher
ones but not vice versa. Result in Figure. 2 shows that
detector trained with stronger adversaries generalize well to
detector trained with weaker adversaries, which is identical
to MNIST/CIFAR10 evaluations.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a approach for detecting adver-
sarial examples with training a binary classifier by
taking saliency perturbation information into considera-
tion. Our approach shows 100% accuracy on detecting
adversarial perturbations on MNIST dataset and show
above 90% accuracy on CIFAR10, Imagenet subset un-
der FGSM/Iterative(l2)/Iterative(l∞)/JSMA/C&W attack. By
quantitatively evaluating generalization ability of the detector,
we conclude that our detector trained with strong adversaries
performs well on weak adversaries, proving its’ generalizabil-
ity and transferability. Moreover, existing second-round attack
methods cannot generate effective adversaries directly.
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